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HEALTH CARE JOINT VENTURES AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS: A GUARDEDLY
OPTIMISTIC PROGNOSIS
Ilene Knable Gotts*
"The times are indeed 'a-changin.' We are now experiencing a
veritable second wave of 'alphabet' organizations in health care
markets."'
One need only read the newspaper or tune in a television news pro-
gram to realize that the future mechanisms by which health care services
will be provided in this country are being debated. Only one fact is cer-
tain: health care delivery is going to change dramatically in the near fu-
ture. Indeed, the health care industry is already undergoing substantial
changes. There has been a clear trend toward consolidation of existing
providers in the past five years. Furthermore, the creation of alternative
delivery systems in anticipation of the changing health care spectrum has
become commonplace throughout the country in the last year or so. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the federal antitrust officials have focused
much attention on the health care industry.' This article will discuss the
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1. Mark J. Horoschak, Assistant Director of Competition, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Remarks Before the Washington State Hospital Association (Sept. 25, 1993) [herein-
after Horoschak].
2. As reported by former Acting Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James in
January 1992, from 1988 to 1992, the Antitrust Division alone gave more than 35 speeches
on the application of antitrust to health care. Charles A. James, Presentation to the Na-
tional Health Lawyers Ass'n 13-14 (Jan. 31, 1992). Furthermore, on September 15, 1993,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) issued six Joint
Policy Statements concerning various aspects of health care. See Department of Justice and
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,150, at 20,758 (Sept. 15, 1993). These joint statements contain the latest stance of the
federal enforcement agencies when evaluating health care activity and are non-binding on
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antitrust implications of some of these changes.
I. BACKGROUND
Medical care in the United States has traditionally been provided to
patients through a fee-for-service indemnity model. In the 1940s, with
the advent of the Kaiser Permanente Medical Plan, delivery systems ap-
peared which departed from the traditional model. However, it was not
until health care costs in this country had escalated at a rate of nearly
twice that of the gross national product and reached almost $700 billion
annually, that consumers and employers began to shift their coverage
from the traditional delivery systems to alternative delivery systems in
meaningful numbers. This shift gained momentum in the 1980s and ac-
celerated during the present decade. Indeed, while the insured popula-
tion enrolled in managed care plans in 1989 was reportedly less than 5%,
that number exceeded 50% in 1991. Nevertheless, as President Clinton
noted in his health care reform policy statement, U.S. health care expend-
itures accounted for 14% of gross domestic product in 1992 and, if un-
checked, would most likely approach 19% by the year 2000. To achieve
health care reform in the dimensions proposed by the Clinton Adminis-
tration, extensive usage of alternative delivery systems and consolidation
of existing systems will be necessary.
The basic forms of alternative delivery systems that have been utilized
in the last decade or so include health maintenance organizations
(HMOs); preferred provider organizations (PPOs); independent practice
associations (IPAs); physician hospital organizations (PHOs); and insurer
hospital joint ventures.' In recent times, new collaborative arrangements
among providers have been forming, such as "group practices without
walls," and community care networks. Furthermore, the Clinton Admin-
istration health care reform package proposes creation of buying groups,
referred to as "Alliances." For most purposes, this article will not distin-
guish among the various forms of alternative delivery systems, but instead
generically refer to these collaborative arrangements as "joint ventures."4
While in some business respects joint ventures in the health care indus-
courts or private litigation. Furthermore, they are subject to refinement and/or change. by
the federal enforcement agencies. Id.
3. For a glossary of terms used in the alternative delivery system context, see Appen-
dix infra.
4. As FTC Assistant Director Mark J. Horoschak stated, "[Alithough the phrase
'joint venture' is not a legal term of art, it does connote collaboration involving a meaning-
ful level of functional integration among venturers." Horoschak, supra note 1.
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try are unique, traditional antitrust principles nevertheless apply to them
with equal force and effect. The antitrust officials do not doubt that the
formation of joint ventures which realize efficiencies (and the opportu-
nity for cost cutting), generally will be pro-competitive. However, the
benefits of a joint venture may not be realized by society, and the overall
impact of the venture can be anti-competitive, if the combination's real
purpose and effect is to stifle competition or eliminate competitors from
the market. Joint ventures may be challenged under section 1 of the
Sherman Act,5 as a concerted and unreasonable restraint of trade, or sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act,6 as monopolization or attempted monopoliza-
tion. Joint ventures may also be challenged under section 7 of the
Clayton Act,7 particularly where there is an integration of pre-existing
operations by the participants.'
Except where the conclusion is reached that the venture is a sham
designed to cloak otherwise illegal conduct, joint activity in the health
care setting is usually evaluated for Sherman Act section 1 purposes
under a rule of reason approach that evaluates both the pro-competitive
effects and anti-competitive effects of the venture to determine whether,
on balance, the venture is pro-competitive. However, a sham venture will
be deemed per se illegal and can even result in criminal liability for its
participants. In today's enforcement environment, physicians and other
providers run a serious risk of criminal investigation and prosecution if
they engage in agreements to fix fees or to negotiate collectively with
third-party payers to increase fees or to suppress or eliminate
discounting.
In 1992, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought its first criminal case
involving health care professionals. 9 In United States v. Alston, the DOJ
prosecuted three Tucson, Arizona dentists for their purported price-fixing
activities. Defendants met with about fifty local dentists at one of the
defendants' offices to discuss the fees provided by local health care plans.
Subsequently, many of those present at the meeting mailed letters to the
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
8. See Nelson v. Monroe Regional Med. Ctr., 925 F.2d 1555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 285 (1991); State v. Mid Coast Anesthesia, P.A., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,683 (Me. Super. Ct. 1992); State v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Assoc., 1992-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,985 (Me. Super. Ct. 1991); State v. Wenatchee Valley Clinic, 1988-1 'Tade Cas.
(CCH) 68,118 (E.D. Wash. 1988); DOJ Business Review Letter to Surgical Associates of
Western Connecticut, P.C., and Danbury Surgical Assoc. (Aug. 29, 1987).
9. United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992).
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plans requesting higher fees. In response, the plans did in fact revise their
fee schedules, which resulted in higher costs to plan members for some
services. From this evidence the jury inferred a per se illegal price-fixing
agreement.10
A more recent example of the willingness of the DOJ to prosecute doc-
tors criminally occurred in the United States v. Massachusetts Allergy So-
ciety1 case in which the DOJ conducted a thorough grand jury
investigation. After all of the evidence was evaluated, the DOJ filed a
civil complaint against the Society, a professional association of about
fifty-five allergists, and four of the individual allergists practicing in Mas-
sachusetts. The complaint alleged that the defendants, along with others,
conspired to fix and raise the fees paid for allergy services by certain
HMOs. As. part of the alleged conspiracy, defendants and their co-con-
spirators purportedly agreed to have the Society act as their joint negoti-
ating agent to obtain higher fees from certain HMOs and to resist
competitive pressures by third-party payers to discount fees. According
to the DOJ, the members of the Society made no attempt to form a valid
joint venture.' 2
Most joint activity will be evaluated in a civil setting. In analyzing such
joint activity, the courts and enforcement agencies consider four factors:
(1) Is the joint venture legitimate?; (2) What are the competitive effects
of the venture?; (3) What are the possible anticompetitive effects of the
venture?; and (4) Are there unreasonable ancillary agreements? The
next four sections of this article will discuss each of these factors in
greater detail. Finally, the last section of the article will address certain
state efforts to provide so-called "state action" immunity for joint cooper-
ative efforts by health care providers.
10. United States v. Alston, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,366 (D. Ariz. 1990), affd,
947 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court judge granted judgments of acquittal
notwithstanding the verdicts for two dentists and ordered a new trial for the third defend-
ant. The Ninth Circuit vacated these post-trial acquittal orders of the district court, but
affirmed the order granting a new trial. The Justice Department then entered into a settle-
ment with the defendants under which the defendant professional corporation pleaded
nolo contendere and agreed to pay a $5,000 fine as well as perform 250 hours of community
service.
11. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,846 (D.-Mass. 1992).
12. Similarly, in United States v. Burgstiner, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,422 (S.D.
Ga. 1991), the DOJ conductedits investigation as if to seek criminal prosecution, but, due
to the willingness of the defendants to enter into a civil consent decree, did not ultimately
bring criminal indictments.
Health Care Joint Ventures
II. Is THE JOINT VENTURE LEGITIMATE?
In the health care setting, concerted activity among health care provid-
ers runs the gamut from a permanent and full integration of the business
operations of its participants to joint ventures in name only. The struc-
ture and purpose of the joint venture often are determinative of whether
its conduct constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws.13 A critical start-
ing point in deciding whether a joint venture is legitimate, is the presence
of a pooling of resources or sharing of risk or the creation and/or market-
ing of a new product made possible only through the joint venture.
In the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society, 4 this issue of risk sharingproved to be the criti-
cal starting point as well as the finale: the Court condemned as per se
illegal an agreement between physicians to fix maximum fees for services
through a joint venture arrangement because the joint venture lacked so-
called "integrative efficiencies." The Court indicated that a health care
plan involving multiple providers might avoid antitrust liability by inte-
grating their activities and creating a joint venture The Court in dicta
recognized as legitimate joint activity the combining of "persons who
would otherwise be competitors [to] pool their capital and share the risks
of loss as well as the opportunities for profit."' 5 Where there is risk shar-
ing, the partnership is more likely to be regarded as a single firm compet-
ing with other sellers in the market.16 However, the physicians in
Maricopa had not attempted to pool their capital and share the risks of
loss, but instead acted as independent entrepreneurs. Accordingly, their
participation in the setting of maximum fees for the PPO constituted per
se illegal horizontal price-fixing.
In contrast, the Court upheld a joint venture arrangement in Broadcast
13. For an excellent discussion of the standards applied to determine the legitimacy of
health care joint ventures, see Kevin E. Grady, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of
Health Care Joint Ventures, 61 ArrTRUST L.J. 765 (1993). See also Robert J. Enders, An
Introduction to Special Antitrust Issues in Health Care Provider Joint Ventures, 61 ANTi-
TRUST L.J. 805 (1993).
14. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
15. Id. at 356.
16. Accord Hassan v. Indep. Practice Assoc., 698 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(holding IPA's reimbursement system did not constitute illegal price fixing because IPA
was a legitimate joint venture that imposed no unreasonable restraint of trade); Preferred
Physicians, Inc., 110 F.T.C. 157, 162 (1988) (consent bans concerted price agreements, but
permits integrated joint venture activities where competitors "pool their capital to finance
the venture"). But see Thompson v. Midwest Found. Indep. Physicians. Ass'n, .1989-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 68,491 (S.D. Ohio 1988) ($32.6 million jury verdict based on price fixing
agreement among IPA members).
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Music, Inc. v. CBS, 7 in which authors and composers granted non-exclu-
sive rights to the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publish-
ers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). In BMI, the Court found
the necessary requisites to establish that "the integration of sales, moni-
toring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use 's in the
form of a blanket license was effectively a new product which could not
exist without the venture. However, in BMI, there was no sharing of risk
or pooling of capital by the composers who used ASCAP and BMI. Per-
haps what ultimately influenced the Court to permit the venture was the
non-exclusive nature of the licenses.
Since the Maricopa and BMI decisions, the lower courts and antitrust
officials have had numerous occasions to scrutinize the legitimacy of ven-
tures. There has been a consistent willingness to condemn summarily
under Sherman Act section 1 joint ventures that lack sufficient integra-
tion when the activities of the participants appear to be a "sham." The
antitrust officials will look beyond the shell to determine the true purpose
of the joint venture. 9 Generally, the greater the degree of integration,
financial investment, and risk sharing as to whether the venture will be
successful, the more likely it will be concluded that the joint venture is
legitimate. E° Therefore, there are two threshold issues that must be ad-
dressed in evaluating a particular joint venture under the antitrust laws:
(1) the legality of the underlying conduct; and (2) the degree of risk shar-
ing and integration by the participants.
17. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
18. Id. at 20.
19. See Southbank IPA (consent decree with IPA in Jacksonville, Fla., and 23 OB/
GYN physicians who together comprised nearly entire staff of hospital. IPA allegedly
agreed on the terms under which they would treat subscribers or employees of health
plans); United States v. Greater Bridgeport Individual Practice Ass'n, 1993-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,389 (D. Conn. 1993); United States v. Mass. Allergy Soc'y, 1992-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 69,846 (D. Mass. 1992); see also Robert E. Bloch, Antitrust in the Health Care
Field: Cutting Edge Issues, Update and Perspectives from the Antitrust Division, Remarks
Before the NHLA (Feb. 19, 1993).
20. Statements made by the DOJ and FTC prior to the issuance of the Joint Statement
appear to express different positions on the necessity of financial integration and risk shar-
ing as to the antitrust implications of a valid joint venture. The DOJ has suggested that
such requirements are not essential. See Charles F. Rule, Antitrust in the Health Care
Field: Distinguishing Resistance from Adaptation, Remarks Before Connecticut Bar Asso-
ciation and Connecticut Health Lawyers Association (Mar. 11, 1992). In contrast, the FTC
requires such investment-and risk sharing to establish a valid joint venture. See Mark J.
Horoschak, Antitrust Perspectives on Joint Ventures Among Health Care Providers, Re-
marks Before the American Bar Association (Aug. 11, 1992).
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A. Purpose of Venture
The legitimacy of the venture often depends partly on the purpose of
the activities undertaken. Joint ventures are considered per se illegal if
the purpose of the venture is to fix prices, decrease competition, or mo-
nopolize a market. For instance, the joint setting of fees by competing
physicians raises serious antitrust concerns, while the joint purchase of
expensive high-tech equipment by two hospitals that then operate it sepa-
rately raises little concern. Health care providers have violated the Sher-
man Act by agreeing on fee schedules, 21 the co-payment rates that would
be accepted by the individual provider,2 2 discounts,23 and relative value
guides.24 The antitrust laws protect the right of a purchaser to have each
competing seller decide independently whether to provide his or her ser-
vice at the price offered by the purchaser.25 Even though independent
providers may not control the payer that sets the final fees, if that payer is
confronted by a united group of providers who have expressly or im-
pliedly threatened not to provide their services unless they get their
"price," then the payer has lost control over its ability to set final fees.
Even without risk sharing, there may be certain actions that can be
taken to minimize the antitrust risk of per se condemnation for joint ac-
21. Cf. In re Mich. St. Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983) (holding the Medical Society
and its members violated Section 5 of the Federal Tade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45,
not the Sherman Act, and ordering the Medical Society and its members to cease from
entering agreements to affect amount, manner of calculating, or terms of reimbursement
and to cease from refusing to enter any participation agreement deemed unacceptable); see
also Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 386 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962) (affirming conviction of pharmaceutical association
and pharmacist on grounds that their agreements to fix prices violated § 1 of Sherman
Act); Colorado ex rel. Woodward v. Colo. Union of Physicians & Surgeons, 1990-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 68,968 (D. Colo. 1990) (consent prohibiting purported union from bargain-
ing collectively with payers).
22. United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992).
23. United States v. N. D. Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986) (agreement
among association members not to grant a discount on hospital services to the Indian
Health Service was declared unlawful under the rule of reason).
24. See In re California Med. Ass'n, 93 F.T.C. 519 (1979); In re American College of
Obstetrics & Gynecology, 88 F.T.C. 955 (1976); see also In re Association of Indep. Den-
tists, 100 F.T.C. 518 (1982) (consent barring association constituting most of the area's
dentists from bargaining or negotiating over price on behalf of member dentists); In re
Rochester Anesthesiologists, 110 F.T.C. 175 (1988) (consent settling charges that anesthe-
siologists conspired to reject reimbursement levels proposed by Blue Cross plan and to
force higher compensation from HMO).
25. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 897 F.2d 226, (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Addison v. FTC, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991); United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d
1206 (9th Cir. 1992).
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tivities of health care providers. Perhaps the single most important step is
to create a distance between the providers and the joint venture in the
pricing of services. The judge in United States v. Alston26 indicated that:
[Hlealth care providers who must deal with consumers indi-
rectly through plans .. . .face an unusual situation that may
legitimate certain collective actions. Medical plans serve, effec-
tively, as the bargaining agents for large groups of consumers;
they use the clout of their consumer base to drive down health
care service fees ... In light of these departures from a normal
competitive market, individual health care providers are entitled
to take some joint action (short of price-fixing or a group boy-
cott) to level the bargaining imbalance created by the plans and
provide meaningful input into the setting of the fee schedules.
Thus, health care providers might pool cost data in justifying a
request for an increased fee schedule .... Providers might also
band together to negotiate various other aspects of their rela-
tionship with the plans such as payment procedures, the type of
documentation they must provide, the method of referring pa-
tients and the mechanism for adjusting disputes. Such concerted
actions, which would not implicate the per se rule, must be care-
fully distinguished from efforts to dictate terms by explicit or
implicit threats of mass withdrawals from the plans.27
Indeed, price terms can be set out in separate agreements with each of
the providers, based on terms proposed by the payer. The contract be-
tween the provider and PPO will sometimes provide for automatic ac-
ceptance unless the provider opts out within specified time periods.
Some of the arrangements considered to minimize antitrust risk in-
clude: (1) having an independent party or committee establish the level
of reimbursement; (2) utilization of a "messenger-model" PPO, in which
the PPO simply communicates offers back and forth between individual
providers and payers, and each provider makes a unilateral decision
whether to participate in a particular contract; (3) the "super-messenger
model," in which the PPO performs a similar function for price offers but
does negotiate non-price terms on behalf of participating providers; and
(4) the "attorney-in-fact model," in which the PPO negotiates ranges of
fees with the payer and sometimes contracts on the providers' behalf. For
instance, the Maricopa consent specifically permitted the physicians'
group to use fee schedules prepared by an "insurer, government agency,
26. 974 F.2d 1206 (1992).
27. 974 F.2d at 1214.
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or other third-party payor."28 The messenger model appears to have
been approved in a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff advisory opin-
ion.29 Some PPOs have characterized their role as having conducted "in-
formational" discussions with the payer or even having made
"suggestions" to the payer as to what rates of payment might be accepta-
ble. However, if the payer perceives itself as being threatened, or if prov-
iders participating in discussions give the impression to other providers
that they must participate in the deliberations, there is risk of per se
condemnation.3 °
Some provider sponsored entities contract with payers on the basis of a
fee schedule or reimbursement formula prepared by a hired consultant.
While this can alleviate some of the risk, it does not always eliminate it.
B. Integration
The federal enforcement agencies have grappled with the concept of
integration for antitrust purposes. Traditionally, the DOJ was more leni-
ent in these matters than the FTC.31 The FTC generally defines integra-
tion as "the coordination or joining together of functions, such as
production, management, promotion, distribution, financing, and debt
collection., 32 To some extent, the degree of integration is a function of
the type of venture. Former Assistant Attorney General Paul McGrath
identified the following types of arrangements as being indicative of inte-
gration: (1) agreement among physicians to accept discounted fees with
no balance billing of patients; (2) utilization review by the PPO; (3) joint
marketing; (4) PPO administration of claims; and (5) an agreement by a
28. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,260 (D.
Ariz. 1983)(consent).
29. See Letter from FTC Staff to Martin J. Thompson (June 20, 1991).
30. See United States v. Mass. Allergy Soc'y, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,846 (D.
Mass. 1992); United States v. Burgstiner, 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,422 (S.D. Ga.
1991).
31. Since only the Department of Justice brings criminal cases, the more lenient sub-
stantive approach taken by the DOJ decreases the chances of criminal prosecution.
32. See, e.g., FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy Regarding Physician Agreements
to Control Medical Prepayment Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,892 (1981) [hereinafter FTC En-
forcement Policy Statement]; Letter from FTC Staff to Gilbert M. Frimet (Mar. 22, 1984);
Letter from FTC Staff to Charles E. Rosolio (May 15, 1987); Letter from FTC Staff to
Michael A. Durcheon, Esq. (Mar. 17, 1986); Letter from FTC Staff to Maryland Medicare
Eye Associates (May 15, 1987); Letter from FTC Staff to Pan American Management As-
sociates, Ltd. (June 27, 1989); DOJ Business Review letter to Frank Sanchez (Oct. 3, 1980);
DOJ Business Review letter to Robert Taylor (Oct. 3, 1986); DOJ Business Review letter
to Northern Mississippi Health Services, Inc. (Apr. 19, 1987); DOJ Business Review letter
to Gregory G. Binford, Esq. (Jan. 7, 1993).
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panel of limited size to bid for control against such groups.3"
More recently, former Assistant Attorney General James Rill indicated
that the DOJ looks for the same sort of integration in the health care
setting as is typical in other business settings, i.e., risk sharing, centralized
operations, and marketing.34 Indeed, a series of FTC advisory letters in-
dicate that if the IPA is capitated, it is sufficiently integrated such that an
agreement among participants as to price will trigger analysis under the
rule of reason rather than be condemned under the per se rule. In con-
trast, PPOs are generally less integrated than IPAs and thus can raise
more significant antitrust issues. In 1983, for instance, the DOJ
threatened to challenge the Stanislaus Preferred Provider Organization.
The PPO contained over 90% of the physicians in the area. Because of
this fact, the DOJ believed the PPO had been formed to preempt capi-
tated plans from entering the area since the participants agreed not to
participate in other alternative delivery systems. 35 The PPO voluntarily
disbanded.
In sum, it is not unusual for the controlling providers in a Venture
either to integrate a portion of their practices into the plan or make a
substantial financial contribution to support the establishment or opera-
tion of the plan, even though they still compete with each other for pa-
tients outside of the joint venture. A plan may be partially integrated by
centralization of marketing, billing and debt collecting functions, or by
sharing the potential financial risks resulting from unanticipated high
costs or utilization. The financial contribution may be in the form of a
capital contribution by the group or mayentail an indirect financial con-
tribution to the plan's operation through a risk-sharing arrangement.
Risk-sharing might be achieved by retaining some portion of the fees pay-
able to participating providers and distributing them to the providers only
if certain criterion, such as reduction in individual patient utilization, is
33. A "partial integration" occurs when the participants combine for limited purposes
but otherwise continue to operate as separate and independent economic parties. For in-
stance, managed care plans are often sponsored and organized by providers (i.e., physicians
and hospitals) who, outside of the plan, compete against one another: care must be taken
to ensure that these plans do not facilitate collusion among participating providers. A
provider-sponsored or controlled plan. in which physicians or hospitals join together to
market their services to third-party purchasers, creates the most concern because it com-
prises competing providers who make decisions regarding fees and provider membership
and utilization can directly affect their competitors. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement,
supra note 32, at 48,893.
34. See James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Remarks Before
the NHLA (Feb. 15, 1991); see also Grady, supra note 13, at 784.
35. See U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release (Oct. 12, 1983).
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achieved. Such an arrangement places the risk of adverse claims experi-
ence on the participants. Without any of the risk-sharing features de-
scribed above, the prognosis for the joint venture under the antitrust laws
is grave.
III. PRO-COMPETITIVE EFFEcrs
A. Defining the Relevant Market
The effects of the joint venture are not considered in a vacuum, but
instead in the relevant geographic and product market in which the ven-
ture will exist. Therefore, the first step to determining the likely effects of
the venture is to define the relevant market. This task is often critical to
the outcome and consequently, can be extremely challenging. Market
definition is determined by (and, conversely, determines) the range of
alternatives available in the market, and, at times, even by the conditions
for entry into the market. The goal is to identify any providers (actual or
potential) offering a service or product that might be a viable substitute
for the product or service at issue. In the case of magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), for instance, other MRIs in the area would be in the mar-
ket, but most likely traditional X-ray equipment would not. For services,
the relevant product market is likely to be defined around a particular
medical specialty. In the case of a multi-specialty joint venture, several
different product markets may have to be examined. The geographic
market tends to be local in nature, although this too can vary depending
on the specialty services involved. As stated in the oft-cited United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.36 case, the relevant product "market is
composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the
purposes for which they are produced - price, use and qualities
considered."37
Once the market has been defined, the analysis shifts to the structure
of- the relevant market, i.e., the concentration of competitors in the mar-
ket and the ease of entry into the market. Market power may be estab-
lished by market share, but other factors are also relevant to the
analysis.38 If no significant barriers to entry exist, then it is unlikely that
the venture will have market power. Stated another way, market power
cannot be exerted where many existing competitors or potential entrants
36. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
37. Id. at 404.
38. Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986);
Bloch, supra note 19.
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(whose entry would be likely, timely, and sufficient) can offer price-disci-
plining substitutes. The existence of concentrated market conditions,
however, will not doom the venture. In such situations, the venture may
still be acceptable if structured to reduce the potential impact on
competition.
B. Pro-competitive Effects from Joint Offering of Services
Joint ventures frequently are efficiency-enhancing, especially
when they are designed to make a new and expensive technol-
ogy available to a community, and are narrowly focused on...
operations where combining resources is likely to result in re-
duced costs and/or better services.
39
As reflected in the above statement by FTC Chairperson Janet Steiger,
joint ventures often produce positive effects without threatening competi-
tion. For instance, to the extent that hospitals or physicians join to share
a service in which they do not compete, such as laundry services, medical
repair services, or data processing, there will generally not be antitrust
concerns because there will almost certainly be no adverse impact on
competition in the market of providing those services.'
Furthermore, to the extent the joint venture offers new services that
neither participant previously offered, the joint venture is less likely to
trigger antitrust scrutiny. Joint ventures that provide services that the
participants could not offer alone are most apt to be permitted. For ex-
ample, if neither hospital could afford to offer MRI services and they
jointly purchase a machine to provide such services, this would be
deemed as positive from an antitrust point of view.
C. Pro-competitive Effects from Joint Purchasing Groups
It is becoming increasingly common for health care providers, such as
hospitals, to form joint purchasing groups. The Sixth Circuit, in White &
White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp.,4 recognized that such ar-
rangements often exhibit great potential for cost-reducing efficiencies as
members may realize economies of scale in purchasing, warehousing, and
39. Janet Steiger, FTC Chairman, Remarks Before the NHLA (Feb. 19, 1993).
40. Id. See also University Health, Inc., 57 Fed. Reg. 29,084 (Fed. 7Tade Comm'n.
1992); Reading Hosp., 55 Fed. Reg. 3264, 3266 (Fed. "lIade Comm'n. 1990)(consent ap-
proved voluntary separation of merged hospitals, with continued sharing of laundry, labo-
ratory, and biomedical equipment repair services).
41. 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983).
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distributing goods, while the potential for anticompetitive effects is low. 42
Groups often are able to use their collective power to negotiate lower
prices, thereby lowering costs.
43
IV. ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTs
On the other hand, certain joint ventures may have actual or potential
market power and, thus, the ability to deter the entry of others or other-
wise cause anticompetitive effects. Furthermore, such ventures can result
in a diminution of competition in the marketplace. This section will ex-
plore the potential anticompetitive effects from collaborative activity.
A. Bottleneck or Essential Facilities
Joint ventures can create "bottlenecks" or become "essential facilities"
for competitors. Denial of participation in a venture can be fatal to a
competitor if such access is an essential source of supply or facility. When
the denial is not justified by plausible pro-competitive reasons, it can re-
sult in per se illegal treatment by a court." The essential facilities doc-
trine imposes liability only when one or more firms that control an
essential facility, which cannot practicably be duplicated, deny reasonable
access on a fair and non-discriminatory basis to another firm that cannot
compete in the marketplace without such access. For instance, in recent
years, a multitude of cases has been brought by physicians who were
either denied or lost hospital privileges asserting that access to the hospi-
tal constituted an "essential facility."'45
42. See Arquit, Remarks Before the ABA Health Care Committee (Apr. 2, 1992);
Assistant Attorney General Charles F. Rule, Remarks Before the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (Oct. 21, 1985).
43. See generally Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monop-
sony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297 (1991); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Measure-
ment of Monopsony Power, 37 AN-mTUST BULL. 133 (1992); Jonathan M. Jacobson &
Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing, Monopsony and Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 1
(1991); Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Monopsony Revisited: A Comment on
Blair and Harrison. 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 151 (1992).
44. Accord Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985); Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 868 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 486 (1989); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Lie v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 964 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1992); Miller v. Indiana
Hosp., 975 F.2d 1550 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1366 (1993); Mann v. Princeton
Community Hosp. Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1992); Okusami v. Psychiatric Inst., 959
F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989 (N.D.
Ga. 1992); Pudlo v. Adamski, 789 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Iii. 1992), affd, 2 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 879 (1994); Mandava v. Howard County Gen. Hosp., 1992-2
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Similarly, if two physician groups control an area's kidney dialysis ma-
chines and decide to upgrade the equipment through a jointly owned fa-
cility, the antitrust officials would be concerned if no other kidney dialysis
capacity was readily available in the market and competing nephrologists
were not allowed access to the equipment for their patients. The risk of
antitrust concerns would be greater in states that require Certificates of
Need for potential competitors to enter.
The FTC is concerned with joint ventures where the joint venturers
(e.g., doctors in a specialty) possess sufficient "referral power" in the ven-
ture product or service to be anti-competitive and raise barriers to en-
try.' In January 1990, the FTC challenged a nephrologist's tying of his
inpatient dialysis services to outpatient facilities he owned when those
facilities constituted 90% of the market.47 Similarly, in American Com-
putech v. National Medical Care4" a jury awarded $605,000 in actual dam-
ages and $2.4 million in punitive damages to a San Diego, California,
kidney dialysis center which was injured by the profit sharing arrange-
ment its competing dialysis center offered area nephrologists. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the decision.49
Issues of provider channeling of patients to ancillary services or prod-
ucts can occur in a variety of settings. For example, it is not uncommon
for orthopaedic surgeons to operate physical therapy centers and radiolo-
gists to own MRI or radiation therapy centers. In addition, the diversifi-
cation of hospitals into new services, such as durable medical equipment
(DME), has raised questions of whether the hospital is an essential facil-
ity with unique access to patients, thus improperly influencing patients to
use the affiliated DME supplier.5"
Also, on November 2, 1993, the FTC accepted proposed consent agree-
ments with twenty-eight pulmonologists who owned two San Francisco
area DME companies that provided home oxygen systems. The FTC al-
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,932 '(D. Md. 1992); Purgess v. Sharrock, 806 F. Supp. 1102
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Flegal v. Christian Hosp. Northeast-Northwest, 804 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D.
Mo. 1992), affd, 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993).
46. Deborah Owen, Remarks Before the Florida Orthopaedic Society (May 15, 1992).
47. In re Gerald S. Friedman, M.D., No. 861-0072 (Jan. 24, 1990).
48. No. 89-55289, 89-55290, 89-55293 (1989), affd, 959 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1992).
49. American Computech, Inc. v. Nat. Med. Care, Inc., 959 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1992).
50. Advanced Health-Care Serv. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir.
1990); M & M Med. Supplies & Serv. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., 738 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. W.
Va. 1990), affd in part and vacated in part, 946 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2962 (1993); Key Enter. v. Venice Hosp., 703 F. Supp 1513 (M.D. Fla. 1989), rev'd, 919
F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992),
order vacated, 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993).
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leged that because these pulmonologists constituted about 60% of the
pulmonologists in the area, they were able to exert market power in the
"DME home oxygen system" market. The consent specifies that no
greater than 25% of the pulmonologists in the area may affiliate with the
DME companies in order to prevent the DME companies from maintain-
ing a captive source of referral large enough to confer market power.51
The antitrust officials and courts are also concerned about exclusion of
products where participation in the plan is necessary to compete in the
marketplace. Participation then becomes, in essence, an "essential facil-
ity." In Oregon Physicians' Services v. Hahn,52 for instance, podiatrists
challenged their exclusion from the Oregon Physician Service (OPS), a
prepaid health care plan founded by between 90-93% of eligible physi-
cians and osteopaths. At the time the podiatrists were denied member-
ship, a majority of the OPS' governing board of trustees were physicians.
The plaintiffs showed that many physicians were direct competitors to
podiatrists. The court indicated that the "proper inquiry is whether prac-
titioners sharing substantially similar economic interests collectively exer-
cised control of a plan.",53  Also, strong evidence indicated that the
exclusion of podiatrists was not based on cost containment considera-
tions. Not all exclusions, however, will have the anti-competitive effects
found to exist in Hahn. 4
B. Diminution of Competition
If the venture involves a high proportion of an area's providers in a
service market, then the antitrust risk increases should participants ex-
plicitly or de facto agree not to participate in managed care other than
through the joint venture. After all, while risk-sharing is important to
establishing the creation of a legitimate joint venture, it can also provide
51. In re Homecare Oxygen & Medical Equip. Co., No. 901-0109 (Nov. 2, 1993); In re
Homecare Oxygen & Medical Equip. Co., No. 901-0020 (Nov. 2, 1993).
52. 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983), appeal after re-
mand, 860 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989).
53. 860 F.2d at 1508.
54. See, e.g., Barry v. Blue Cross, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986)(court rejected a boycott
claim based on a provision of the Blue Cross plan that prohibited participants from refer-
ring patients to non-participants without first notifying the patient that the physician was a
non-participant. Since reimbursement rates differed on whether the physician was a "par-
ticipating" physician, the referral clause operated to make a patient's choice of a nonpar-
ticipant less likely. The court, however, concluded that the referral clause was not an
illegal group boycott because physicians could still refer patients to nonparticipating physi-
cians and could contract with other plans).
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the participants with the incentive not to compete.
55
The DOJ/FTC Policy Statements indicate that absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances, the agencies will not challenge a physician joint venture that
includes up to 20% of the physicians in each physician specialty who have
active hospital staff privileges, practice in the relevant geographic market,
and share substantial financial risk.56 In relevant markets with less than
five physicians in a particular specialty, a joint venture otherwise qualify-
ing for the safety zone may include one physician even though this will
result in a joint venture of more than 20% of the physicians in that
specialty.
The antitrust safety zone applies equally to "exclusive" and "non-exclu-
sive" networks. In contrast, for those ventures falling outside the safety
zone, an "exclusive venture" raises significantly more risk of challenge
than a non-exclusive venture. After all, exclusive management will re-
strict the ability of its members to affiliate with other networks and to
contract individually with health insurance plans. Physician networks will
be reviewed under the rule of reason if the physicians share substantial
risk or if the physicians' ability to associate enables them to offer a new
product producing substantial efficiencies. The Policy Statements also
recognize that in small rural markets, it may be necessary for purchasers
of health care services to contract with a relatively large number of physi-
cians to provide adequate coverage and choice for enrollers. In such mar-
kets, it is unlikely that the joint venture's relatively large market share of
some specialists will raise concerns so long as there is: (1) a demon-
strated ability of health insurance plans to contract with physicians indi-
vidually, if they so desire; (2) a possibility that other networks could be
formed; and (3) benefits to health insurance plans from obtaining cover-
age provided by the network.57
55. Citizen Publ. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (profit pooling arrangement
evidenced price fixing).
56. Dept. of Justice & FTC Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health
Care Area, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13, 150 (Sept. 15, 1993).
57. On Sept. 28, 1993, the DOJ announced it does not intend to challenge a proposal
by National Cardiovascular Network, Inc. (NCN) to establish a national network of cardi-
ologists, cardiovascular surgeons and acute care hospitals. The Department characterized
the NCN proposal as "similar to other recently developed alternative delivery systems fea-
turing a national network of medical 'centers of excellence' that provide specialized medi-
cal care." NCN would create a PPO of cardiac care specialists in 41 metropolitan areas
nationwide to provide cardiac care to beneficiaries of large third-party payers. In 38 of the
41 metropolitan areas, NCN does not plan initially to contract with any cardiologists, car-
diovascular surgeons, or acute care hospitals that currently compete with each other. In
the other three cities, NCN assured the Department that it will not contract with more than
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Similarly, the antitrust officials become concerned when the purchasing
group has the power to force suppliers to sell at prices below a competi-
tive level, thereby causing possible dislocation of market allocations and
efficiencies.58 In the mid 1980s, the DOJ adopted a 35/20 "safe harbor."
If a group's volume accounted for less than 35% of the total capacity of
the sellers in the market, then the DOJ considered it unlikely that pur-
chasers were exercising monopsony power to drive down prices. The
DOJ safe harbor applied to instances where the purchased good or ser-
vice constituted up to 20% of the price of the final product. The concern
here was that if the jointly purchased product constituted a higher per-
centage of the final price, there may have been anti-competitive pricing of
the final product.59 In 1991, then Assistant Attorney General James Rill
announced that the DOJ would no longer automatically follow the 35%
rule in the PPO setting and would instead use the analytic framework of
the Merger Guidelines for such PPOs.
However, the DOJ/FTC Policy Statements set forth an "antitrust safety
zone" that, absent extraordinary circumstances, protects from federal
governmental challenge any joint purchasing arrangement among health
care providers under the 35/20 rule. For joint purchasing arrangements
that fall outside the antitrust safety zone, the Policy Statements identify
several safeguards that may mitigate enforcement concerns that might
otherwise arise. First, antitrust concern is lessened if members are not
required to use the arrangement for all of their purchases of a particular
product or service; however, members can be asked to commit to
purchase a voluntarily specified amount through the arrangement so that
a volume discount for other favorable contracts can be negotiated. Sec-
ond, antitrust risk is lowered where negotiations are conducted on behalf
20% of the cardiologists or cardiovascular surgeons with active admitting privileges at hos-
pitals in the relevant geographic market, thereby availing it of the antitrust safety zone.
See Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, De-
partment of Justice, to Frederick H. von Unwerth, Esq. (Sept. 28, 1993).
58. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948)(competitors in highly concentrated market agreement concerning purchase price of
sugar was per se illegal). One recent commentator indicated that to the extent that third-
party payers combine efforts and jointly acquire services only from a single source, "it is
unlikely that any group effort ... could account for a sufficiently large percentage of po-
tential 'purchasers' to raise an antitrust concern regarding foreclosure." Kathryn M. Fen-
ton, Antitrust Implications of Joint Efforts by Third Party Payors to Reduce Costs and
Improve the Quality of Health Care, 61 ANTrrRUST L.J. 17, 36 (1992).
59. See Letter from James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, to Patrick McAdam,
Esq. (Aug. 22, 1989) (on file with J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y); Letter from Charles F.
Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Marc L. Fleischaker, Esq. (May 18, 1987) (on
file with J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y).
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of the joint purchasing arrangement by an independent employee or
agent who is not also an employee of a participant. Finally, the Policy
Statements advocate that the purchasing group and each individual par-
ticipant keep communications confidential and not share information
with the other participants. The enforcement agencies note that existence
of a large number and variety of purchasing groups in the health care
field suggests that entry barriers to forming new groups are not great and
that, in most circumstances, it is not necessary to open a joint purchasing
arrangement to all competitors in the market.
It is important to be cognizant of the distinction between purchasing an
input jointly and entering into an agreement either to fix the price of
inputs or to refuse to compete for certain inputs when considering the
permissibility of a joint purchasing arrangement. For example, in 1992,
the DOJ instituted criminal investigations of hospitals that had allegedly
colluded in attempting to fix prices paid for nurses and other health care
provider employees.'
V. ANCILLARY AGREEMENTS
Joint ventures sometimes run afoul of the antitrust laws due to ancillary
agreements that unreasonably restrain competition without contributing
to the joint ventures' legitimate purposes. This section will address the
improper usage of joint ventures to engage in group boycotts, to fix prices
or restrict output for unrelated activities, or to raise entry barriers for
potential competitors of the venture by imposing exclusivity
requirements.
A. Group Boycotts
A frequent ground for antitrust challenge by private parties and the
government alike is for members of a venture to force customers or recal-
citrant competing providers to agree to terms through threatened or ac-
tual concerted refusals to deal or boycott.61 The federal enforcement
60. See In re Debes, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,025 (Aug. 28, 1992)(consent concerning nursing
home owners in Rockford, Illinois exchanging information about nurse registries in the
area for five years and/or entering into joint purchasing agreements for nursing services for
ten years); All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Memorial Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535
(11th Cir. 1989)(hospitals agreed to deal only with selected agencies when hiring tempo-
rary nurses).
61. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (found dentists liable for con-
certed refusal to cooperate with insurer utilization review requirement to submit X-rays in
advance of treatment); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) (conspiracy to terminate a hospital provider that was
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agencies have been particularly concerned about concerted efforts by
providers to hamper the introduction of alternative delivery systems that
compete with fee-for-service medicine.
In United States v. Greater Bridgeport Individual Practice Ass'n,62 for
instance, a legitimate IPA went beyond the scope of its mandate and en-
gaged in what was, according to the DOJ, for all practical purposes, a
boycott to obtain higher fees. The DOJ claimed that the IPA's conduct
constituted a conspiracy, implemented by many of its approximately 670
members, by not contracting individually with an HMO. The complaint
alleged that after the HMO and the IPA reached an impasse during con-
tract negotiations, the IPA and its members, in response to the HMO's
initiative to contract individually with the IPA's physicians, participated
in a conspiracy not to contract individually with the HMO. One purpose
of the conspiracy was purportedly to force the HMO to increase the fees
it paid to the IPA.
The extent to which such conduct will be permitted (under either a per
se treatment or rule of reason approach) will typically depend on the
market shares of the participants. 63 Furthermore, the courts have been
reluctant to strike down objective standards for the exclusion of certain
aligned with other competing managed care programs and the announcement of this termi-
nation to all other hospitals was an unlawful attempt to limit competition in the health care
financing market); Pa. Dental Ass'n v. Med. Serv. Ass'n, 815 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987) (agreement departicipating dentists in Blue Shield illegal under
truncated rule of reason); Hassan v. Indep. Prac. Assoc., P.C., 698 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich.
1988); In re Michigan State Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983); Medical Staff of Broward
Gen. Med. Ctr., 56 Fed. Reg. 49,184 (Sept. 27, 1991) (consent order prohibited physicians
with staff privileges from threatening to boycott the hospital in order to coerce the hospital
not to enter a business relationship with the Cleveland Clinic); In re Medical Staff of John
C. Lincoln Hosp. and Health Ctr., 106 F.T.C. 291 (1985) (consent order prohibited physi-
cians from coercing hospital not to enter a relationship with urgent care facility which
competed with physicians).
62. United States v. Greater Bridgeport Individual Practice Ass'n, 1993-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,389 (D. Conn. 1993).
63. See, e.g., Northwest Med. Lab., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 794 P.2d 428 (Or.
1990) (under rule of reason test, court found for defendants because defendant's 2.1%
share of the health financial market was too small to establish anticompetitive effect); Has-
san v. Indep. Practice Assoc., 698 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (court rejected claim of
allergists who were denied membership in an IPA because (1) the plan was a legitimate
joint venture, with physicians sharing the risk of loss, as well as opportunities for profit, by
accepting capitation payments from the HMO; (2) these arrangements made a new product
available to consumers from traditional fee-for-service physician services; and (3) the
HMO's 20% share of the health care finance market, the absence of significant barriers to
entry, and a recent price decrease by the HMO in issue). Accord Capital Imaging Associ-
ates, P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Associates, 791 F. Supp. 956 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 996
F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct 388 (1993).
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classes of providers where it was not shown that the exclusion resulted in
a significant diminution of competition in the marketplace.'
B. Exclusive Arrangements
The same issues of exclusion arise in an exclusive contract setting. Ac-
cording to FTC Assistant Director of Competition Mark Horoschak:
Exclusive arrangements are likely to endanger competition only
if the [managed care plan] using them is able to obtain, and re-
tain exclusivity commitments from such a large proportion of
the physicians in the area or in a particular specialty, that the
other plans are deprived of access to the physicians they need to
operate effectively.
65
In addition, the exclusive affiliation of providers with a plan may consti-
tute a significant barrier to entry for other alternative delivery systems. 66
In evaluating an exclusive arrangement, courts typically consider the
degree of market foreclosure involved (e.g., the percentage of suppliers of
health care services). In the context of PPOs and IPAs, in certain circum-
stances, exclusion of certain providers from the group is not only permit-
ted under the antitrust laws, but even encouraged. Therefore, PPOs need
not be overly concerned about excluding physicians or hospitals as par-
ticipants because the essential feature of a PPO is its selectivity. Indeed,
the primary competitive risk of a PPO is over-inclusiveness rather than
exclusion. Thus, the exclusion of some interested providers will likely
promote competition among panels and is a necessary part of the pro-
cess. 67 In some respects, the DOJ/FTC Policy Statement is more con-
servative than individual opinions issued by the enforcement agencies
and courts.68  Neither agency will usually challenge a PPO where the
64. Capital Imaging Associates, 791 F. Supp. at 967 (exclusion of radiologists from an
IPA that contracted with an HMO did not have an adverse effect on competition since the
HMO contracted with only 6.75% of licensed physicians in the market, competed with 53
other HMOs and enrolled 2.3% of subscribers in the health care financing market; none of
these physicians were precluded from referring non-HMO patients to the excluded radi-
ologists). See Blue Cross v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,590
(W.D. Wash. 1981); In re Medical Serv. Corp., 88 F.T.C. 906 (1976).
65. Mark J. Horoschak, Remarks Before the ABA (Aug. 11, 1992).
66. Hassan, 698 F. Supp. at 695.
67. Paul McGrath, Remarks Before the ABA (March 22, 1985). See supra notes 27-28
and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Letter from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to
Frank Sanchez (Oct. 3, 1986) (on file with Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy)
(no opposition to pharmacy sponsored PPO's pricing activities which involved 30% of
pharmacies participating, and up to 50% in rural areas).
Health Care Joint Ventures
panel provides a competitive alternative rather than a blockade to com-
petition in local markets.69
The federal enforcement agencies currently consider the impact of an
exercise of market power on managed care plans relevant. PPOs and
IPAs are formed, in most cases, to negotiate with managed care plans.
Such plans, because of their use of selective contracting, are better able to
respond to price increases.
One important factor that the agencies consider is the extent to which
the members of the venture have agreed to use the venture as their exclu-
sive agent in contracting with managed care plans. Exclusivity can either
be explicit or implicit. In determining implicit exclusivity, the agencies
consider the physicians' conduct as well as a variety of market character-
istics, including the number of physicians in the venture and where they
have staff privileges. The concern is that a large PPO or IPA that acts as
the exclusive bargaining agent for its members may be able to set supra-
competitive fees or deter the development of managed care. An "exclu-
sive venture" also raises significantly more risk of challenge because it
restricts the ability to affiliate with other networks or to compete
individually.
Some exclusive arrangements have been scrutinized and ultimately
challenged by federal and state enforcement agencies. In Ohio ex rel.
Celebrezze v. Greater Cleveland Hospital Ass'n,7 ° for example, the state
challenged an association that accounted for 90% of the hospitals in the
Cleveland area when it attempted to establish an insurance plan in which
only member hospitals could participate and which refused to contract
with other insurers except at higher rates. A consent order was entered
into with the association that prohibits the association from conspiring to
discourage hospitals from organizing, operating, or contracting with other
plans.71
Criteria for PPO membership related to cost efficiency, historical utili-
zation, and willingness to comply with utilization review are legitimate
considerations. 72 The criteria used to select plan participants may be im-
69. See also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. U.S. Healthsource, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,697 (D.N.H. 1992), affd, 986 F.2d 589.(lst Cir. 1993) (court rejected an HMO's chal-
lenge of an optional exclusivity clause in contracts entered into between another HMO and
primary care physicians because the defendants controlled only 4-5% of the state's
population).
70. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) '1 65,685 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
71. Id.
72. Hassan, 698 F. Supp. at 679 (refusal to readmit allergist-was a cost containment
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portant to the policy's defense.73 However, the elimination of competi-
tion among providers (by combining services or allocating markets) to
halt costly duplicative services and ensure quality care has been rejected
by the courts as well as the federal enforcement agencies.
74
C. Restraints on Subscriber's Choice of Providers
Another type of ancillary restraint entails requiring the payers to con-
tract exclusively with the joint venture or providing the payer or its sub-
scribers with financial incentives (e.g., "deductibles" or "credits") to use
the venture. Arguably, the former of these practices, and perhaps even
the latter practice, constitutes a "tying" arrangement under which sub-
scribers are foreclosed from other sources of care. Absent a showing of
market power on the part of the venture,75 however, it is unlikely that the
venture will be found to have foreclosed meaningful competition in the
local provider payer markets.76
D. Spillover Effects
In less than fully integrated joint ventures, there may be some concern
about collaboration that will spill over into areas where there is existing
competition between the joint venturers. As former FTC Competition
Bureau Director Kevin Arquit stated: "A legitimate joint venture may
justify certain restraints so long as they are reasonably necessary to at-
tainment of efficiencies. 77 Care should nevertheless be taken to ensure
that the exchange of information by participants for the venture does not
facilitate price fixing or concerted refusals to deal with the individual par-
measure); Northwest Med. Lab., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 794 P.2d 428 (Or.
1990)(limited panel was used to control utilization).
73. EGH, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 1991-2 Tade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,642 (D. Or.
1991) (competitive bidding); Capital Imaging Associates v. Mohawk Valley Associates,
791 F. Supp. 956 (N.Y.N.D. 1992), affd, 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 388
(1993) (geographic location of the provider relative to the patient population and sufficient
capacity of range of services to support patient population may be legitimate bases for
exclusion of a plan participant).
74. In re Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985), affd, 807 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987). But see Horoschak, supra note 65.
75. The analysis of market power should include consideration of any distinct geo-
graphic areas and specialized services or providers that could give the venture some ability
to affect competition adversely.
76. See generally Enders, supra note 13, at 824-25 (discussion of "tying" restraint).
77. Kevin J. Arquit, A New Concern in Health Care Antitrust Enforcement: Acquisi-
tion 'and Exercise of Market Power by Physician Ancillary Joint Ventures, Remarks Before
the NHLA at 4-5 (Jan. 30, 1992) (on file with Journal of Contemporary Health Law &
Policy).
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ticipants in activities outside the ventures.78
Sometimes networks provide other services, such as allocating services
among providers, approving budgets, or rationalizing overcapacity to
avoid duplication. This may actually exacerbate antitrust concerns.79
Spillover effects can often be minimized or eliminated by the imposition
of structural safeguards and other measures designed to ensure that col-
laboration among participants stops with the venture.
One of the spillover concerns may be whether, as a result of the ven-
ture, participants share information about non-venture activities. While
it may not be a violation of antitrust laws for competing providers to sup-
ply information on a voluntary basis to third-party payers, providers may
be tempted to step over that line and agree on what they consider to be
"appropriate" fees, or otherwise attempt to pressure or coerce payers to
increase their fees. In such situations, the DOJ will focus on: (1) who
initiated price discussions; (2) what, if anything, did the third-party payer
request from the providers and what did the payer receive; (3) what, if
anything, did the providers agree to; (4) what their objective was; and (5)
whether there was any implied or express refusal to deny or threat to
withhold services.
VI. STATE ACTION IMMUNITY
A number of new state laws enacted in 1992 and 1993 aim to promote
collective action in the health care field.' In adopting their laws, some of
these states have attempted to provide state action immunity for the col-
laborative activities. However, the judicially created state action doctrine
has recently been narrowly construed by the United States Supreme
Court in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.81 to immunize conduct only if
78. Bloch, supra note 19, at 20; Owen, supra note 46.
79. See State v. Wenatchee Valley Clinic, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,118 (E.D.
Wash. 1988); Letter from FTC staff to F. Tim Witsman (May 12, 1991); Letter from Assis-
tant Attorney General Sandy Litvack to William Kopit, Esq. (May 8, 1980).
80. These states include Colorado (Hospital Efficiency Cooperation Act, 1993 Colo.
Sess. Laws 120, codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-32-2701 et al.), Florida (Health Care
and Insurance Reform Act, 1993 Fla. Laws Ch. 129, codified FLA. STAT. CH. 395.606),
Georgia (Act of July 1, 1992, 1993 Ga. Laws 496, codified GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-72-1),
Iowa (1993 Iowa Legis. Serv. 380 (West)), Maine (1992 Me. Laws 814), Minnesota (1993
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 345 (West), codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 625-2911 to 2021),
Montana (1993 Mont. Laws 606), Oregon (1993 Or. Laws 769), Tennessee (Hospital Coop-
eration Act of 1993, Tenn. Rb. Acts 33, codified at TENN. CODE ANN: §§ 68-11-1301 to
1309), Texas (1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 373 (Vernon)), and Washington (1993 Wash. Laws
492).
81. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
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there is substantial state supervision of the activities. Indeed, the FTC
staff recently commented on proposed legislation in North Dakota aimed
at providing immunity to hospitals and health providers.8 2 The staff indi-
cated that the pending bills would not meet the active supervision re-
quirement because they did not provide for scrutiny of the actions of the
parties to an agreement after the issuance of a certificate authorizing the
formation of the cooperative arrangement. Thus, even where state law
purports to immunize providers, such providers should proceed cau-
tiously with conduct that would likely raise antitrust concerns absent the
immunity.
VII. CONCLUSION
The cry for health care reform seems destined to increase the trend
toward consolidation and employment of alternative delivery systems
rather than the elimination of them. "Antitrust safety zones" currently
are delineated by the federal enforcement agencies for certain joint con-
duct by health care providers. Similarly, sham joint ventures which have
as their real mission such anti-competitive conduct as price fixing or con-
certed refusals to deal, will be summarily attacked as per se illegal. Prov-
iders must not use the formation of a venture as a guise to hide otherwise
anti-competitive conduct or to slow initiatives to contain costs in the in-
dustry. A vast majority of joint ventures will neither be condemned per
se nor protected under safety zone; instead most joint conduct will be
subject to scrutiny under the rule of reason. First, the federal enforce-
ment agencies and/or a court will consider whether there are "pro-com-
petitive effects" from the conduct. There is no doubt that health care
joint ventures are desirable from an antitrust perspective given their facil-
itation of new services and efficiencies. Second, the anti-competitive ef-
fects will be evaluated. Finally, the ancillary or spillover effects of the
venture will be evaluated. To minimize the risks of antitrust challenge,
providers should not stray away from the venture's pro-competitive mis-
sion of creating efficiencies and offering new products and services or
engaging in ancillary agreements that have adverse competitive effects.
Failure to adhere to these principles raises the potential of both civil and
criminal challenges under the antitrust laws.
APPENDIX
An HMO is an entity that provides a package of health care services on a
82. Letter from FTC Staff to David W. Huey (Mar. 8, 1993).
Health Care Joint Ventures
prepaid basis at specified facilities. There are two models for HMOs - a
staff model in which the providers are employees of the HMO and an
IPA-type model in which the providers are individual physicians who con-
tract to provide services to the HMO on a capitated basis.
A PPO is an organization of health care providers who contract to pro-
vide their services to a defined group of patients on a reduced fee-for-
service basis. PPOs often do not involve risk sharing.
An IPA is an association of individual providers who pool their resources
and share expenses, e.g., equipment, staff, recordkeeping. The IPA usu-
ally contracts with various health care plans to provide health care serv-
ices on an "at-risk" basis to provide medical services to their subscribers.
A PHO is an arrangement between one or more hospitals and physicians
on their medical staffs to provide health care services on a prepaid basis
to third-party payers.
An insurer hospital joint venture is an arrangement between one or more
hospitals and an insurer to offer a package of health care services on a
prepaid basis. The insurer usually performs the administrative functions.
A "group practice without walls" involves the integration of private prac-
tice physicians into a group practice in which each doctor can retain sepa-
rate offices, but administration is centralized and financial affairs are
integrated.
A community care network entails the collaboration of various providers,
such as a multi-hospital network and possibly physicians or physician or-
ganizations, which may negotiate with third-party payers and consolidate
functions across a broad range, including capital budgeting, marketing,
and the purchase of equipment.
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